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FACTS
On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, a United States citizen returning from
Pakistan to Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, was arrested by federal
agents executing a material witness warrant in connection with the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.! Padilla was transferred to New York
and held under federal criminal custody.2 On May 22, Padilla moved to
vacate the material witness warrant.3
On June 9, while Padilla's motion was still pending, the President,
invoking his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed
Forces4 and pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution (AUMF),5 issued an order to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld to detain Padilla under military custody as an enemy combatant.6
Subsequently, Department of Defense officials took Padilla into custody and
transported him to the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South
Carolina.7
Two days later, Padilla's appointed counsel filed a habeas corpus
petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Southern District). The petition alleged that Padilla's military
detention violated the Fourth,8 Fifth9 and Sixth l° Amendments and the
Suspension Clause I" of the United States Constitution. 12 The petition named
as respondents President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, and Commander Melaine Marr of the Consolidated Naval Brig.'
3
The Government moved to dismiss, arguing that the only proper respondent
was Commander Marr, Padilla's immediate custodian, and that the Southern
I Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the
United States... ").
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) ("The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons").
6 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
7 Id. at 2716.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 U.S. CONST. amend V.
10 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it").
12 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2716.
13 Id.
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District lacked jurisdiction over her. 14  The Government further contended
that the President had the authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant
pursuant to the Commander in Chief Clause of the Constitution, 15 the
AUMF, 16 and Exparte Quirin.
17
The Southern District held that Secretary Rumsfeld was a proper
respondent to the habeas petition because of his personal involvement in
Padilla's military detention, and that jurisdiction over the Secretary could be
asserted under New York's long-arm statute.' 8  However, the Southern
District accepted the Government's contentions on the merits that the
President has authority to detain Padilla, a citizen arrested on American soil,
as an enemy combatant. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part.20 On the question of the proper respondent, the appellate
court agreed with the Southern District.21 It held that on these unique facts,
Secretary Rumsfeld was Padilla's custodian because of his personal
involvement in Padilla's detention, finding that he exercised "the legal reality
of control" over Padilla.22 The court also affirmed the Southern District's
holding that New York's long-arm statute provides jurisdiction over
Secretary Rumsfeld.23
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Southern District on the
merits of the military detention, concluding that neither the President's
Commander in Chief power nor the AUMF authorizes military detentions of
14 Id.
Is U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
16 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
'7 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the President had authority to order the
detention four German saboteurs to be tried before a military commission). In Quirin, eight German-born
United States residents were captured as they tried to enter the country during war time for the purpose of
sabotage. Id. at 7. The President of the United States decreed that petitioners were to be tried before a
military tribunal. Id. at 8. The petitioners challenged the President's authority, arguing that under the U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, and U.S. CONST. amends. V and VL petitioners had a right to demand a jury trial at
common law in the civil courts. Id. at 9. The Court found that petitioners were unlawful belligerents and
were not entitled to be tried in a civil proceeding. Id. at 16. The Court also determined that trying
petitioners before a military court was not illegal and did not violate the U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI,
relating to "crimes" and "criminal prosecutions." Id. Thus, the court affirmed the President's authority to
try petitioners before a military tribunal without a jury. Id. at 18.
18 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2717 (citing Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003)).
21 Id.
22 Id. (citing Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 707-08 (2d Cir. 2003)) (reasoning that in cases
where the habeas petitioner is detained for other than federal criminal violations, the Supreme Court has
recognized exceptions to the general rule of naming the immediate physical custodian as respondent).
23 Id. (citing Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 708-10 (2d Cir. 2003))
[Vol. 1 1:251
Rumsfeld v. Padilla
American citizens captured on American soil.24 Accordingly, the court ruled
that the President lacked authority to place Padilla in military detention. 25 It
granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered Padilla's release within thirty
days.26 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review
the Court of Appeal's rulings on jurisdiction over the proper respondents and
the merits of Padilla's military detention.27
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and dismissed the
case without prejudice.28 The Court held that a habeas challenge to physical
custody must name the immediate custodian as respondent, in this case,
Commander Marr.29 Despite the unique circumstances surrounding Padilla's
detention, the Court distinguished his case from a limited number of
exceptions to the immediate custodian rule. 30  Furthermore, the Court held
that the Southern District did not have jurisdiction over Commander Marr.3'
The Court did not reach the merits of Padilla's military detention because it
answered the jurisdiction question in the negative.32
ANALYSIS
The Court analyzed the two parts of the jurisdictional issue and
decided that Padilla had improperly filed his habeas petition in the Southern
District.3 3 The first jurisdictional issue was whether the habeas petition was
filed against the proper respondents.34 Counsel for Padilla filed the petition
under the federal habeas statute35 and named President Bush, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and Commander Marr as respondents.36 The Court began its
analysis with the language of the federal habeas statute, which provides that
the proper respondent to a habeas petition is the "person who has custody
24 Id. (citing Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712-18 (2d Cir. 2003)) (determining that in
Supreme Court case law and in the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1971), there is a strong
presumption against domestic military detention of citizens absent explicit congressional authorization).




29 Id. at 2722.
30 Id. at 2715.
31 Id. at 2727.
32 Id. at 2715.
33 Id. at 2717.
3 Id.
35 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1948).
36 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2716.
2005]
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
over the petitioner."'37 The statute also provides that the habeas writ must be
filed against the physical custodian of the prison. a The Court reasoned that
because of the use of the definite article, "the," in reference to "custodian,"
there must generally be only one proper respondent to a habeas petition.39
The custodian must be the person with the ability to produce the prisoner's
body before the court.4°
The Court cited Wales v. Whitney,4' as an example of how case law
has interpreted the language of the habeas statute for over one hundred
years. 42  In Wales, the Court characterized the statute by stating, "these
provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the
immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body
of such party before the Court or judge, that he be liberated if no sufficient
reason is shown to the contrary., 43 According to the statutory language and
the immediate custodian rule set forth in Wales, the default rule for a habeas
challenge to present physical confinement is that the proper respondent must
be the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.44  After
concluding that the proper respondent is Commander Marr, not Secretary
Rumsfeld, the Court addressed the arguments raised by Padilla, the Court of
Appeals, and Justice Stevens' dissent as to why the immediate custodian rule
should not apply.45
37 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1948)).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2717.
40 Id.
41 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (holding that an military officer is not under personal
physical restraint for purpose of habeas petition if the only restraint on his liberty was the moral restraint
of obeying military orders to stay at his post pending a court-martial). In Wales, a Naval medical was
served with notice that he was to face a court-martial for misconduct. Id. at 565. He was also ordered not
to leave his station but was not physically restrained in any way. Id. In refusing his habeas petition, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the writ of habeas corpus historically and statutorily
embraced situations where some type of physical, rather than merely moral, restraint had occurred. Id. at
571. As a military officer, petitioner was normally required to obtain a leave of absence to leave town;
that situation did not change by the bringing of court-martial proceedings. Id. Because petitioner was not
restrained of his liberty or in physical custody of the Navy, the Court affirmed dismissal of the petition for
the writ. Id. at 573-575.
42 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2716.
43 Wales, 114 U.S. at 574.
44 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2716.
45 Id.
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Padilla cited Hensley v. Municipal Court as an exception to the
immediate custodian rule.47 Padilla argued that the Court in Hensley had
adopted a more expansive definition of custody, such as a person released on
his own recognizance is not in custody for habeas purposes. 48  The majority
rejected this argument, reasoning that a definition of "custody" broadened to
include restraints short of physical confinement, as articulated in Hensley,
does not create an exception to the general rule of immediate custodian, as
articulated in Wales.
49
The Court also determined that the Court of Appeals erred in
believing that in certain cases the immediate custodian rule can be relaxed to
allow as a proper respondent the person exercising the "legal reality of
control" over the petitioner. 50 Cases cited by Padilla applied only to habeas
petitions challenging situations other then immediate physical confinement.5 '
Padilla cited Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,52 as an
allowable exception to the immediate custodian rule. In Braden, a prisoner
in Alabama filed a habeas petition against the Circuit Court in Kentucky.53
The Court found that the habeas petition challenged the future detention of
the prisoner in another state, not his present physical detention but allowed
the petition to stand because only jurisdiction over the respondent court is
required.54 The exception in Braden is limited to habeas petitions, which
46 Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County., 411 U.S.
345 (1973) (holding that for purpose of habeas petition a prisoner was considered under custody because
he was subject to restraints not shared by the public generally-an obligation to appear at all times and
places as ordered by any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction). In Hensley, the petitioner was
convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to serve one year in jail and pay a fine. Id. at 347. After
petitioner appealed his conviction and exhausted all available state remedies, he filed for relief under the
federal habeas corpus statute. Id. The question presented was whether the conditions imposed upon
petitioner as the price of his release constituted "custody" as that term was used in the habeas corpus
statute. Id. at 350. The Court held that petitioner was in custody for purposes of the statute because
petitioner was subject to restraints not shared by the public generally because he had an obligation to
appear at all times and places as ordered by any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction, and
petitioner remained at large only by the grace of a stay entered first by the trial court and then extended by
two Justices of the Court. Id. at 351-53.
47 Rusmfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2718.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2719.
51 Id.
52 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (holding that an Alabama
prisoner may file a habeas petition against the Kentucky court because the challenge was against a
"confinement that would be imposed in the future," thus the custodian for purpose of habeas petition was
not the warden in Alabama but the court in Kentucky.) In Braden, the prisoner was confined to an
Alabama prison when he applied to the District Court of the Western District of Kentucky for a writ of
federal habeas corpus. Id. The Court ruled that the Kentucky district court had jurisdiction to rule on
petitioner's federal writ of habeas corpus, as the court was only required to have jurisdiction over
respondent court. Id. at 497-99.
53 Braden, 410 U.S. at 484.
54 Id. at 497-99.
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
challenge a form of custody other than present physical confinement.5
Padilla's challenge was against his physical confinement in the Naval Brig,
and Braden does not support a departure from the immediate custodian rule
in Padilla's case.56 The Court also pointed to the favorable citation of Wales
in Braden, which "reiterated the traditional rule that a prisoner seeking
release from confinement must sue his jailer.
57
Next, the Court addressed Padilla's reliance on Strait v. Laird.5 8 In
Strait, the Court held that a reservist's nominal custodian was an officer in
Indiana who has his Army records. 9 Padilla argued that he should similarly
be allowed to designate Secretary Rumsfeld as his "nominal" custodian.'
Strait did not apply because the petitioner in Strait was not challenging his
present physical confinement. 61 The majority reasoned that the immediate
custodian rule did not apply in Braden and Strait because there were no
"immediate custodians" germane to the petitioners' challenges. 62  In the
present case, there should be no determination of "legal control custodian" or
"nominal custodian," because Padilla's challenge was against his immediate
detention in the Naval Brig, and Commander Marr had physical custody over
Padilla.63 The Court reasoned that to allow applications of "legal control" or
"nominal" custodian tests in challenges to present physical custody would
allow prisoners to name any State or United States Attorney General as a
respondent.64 This directly contradicts both the statutory language and case
law.65
55 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2719.
56 Id.
57 Id. (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495).
58 Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972) (holing that a California reservist's nominal custodian
was his commanding officer in Indiana who had charge of the petitioner's Army records). In Strait, a
reserve officer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in California. Id. The court determined that it
was in California that the reserve officer had his only meaningful contact with the Army. Id. at 345. To
say that his custodian was amenable to process only in Indiana, where the Army chose to locate its
recordkeeping center, would exalt fiction over reality. Id. The reserve officer's commanding officer was
present in California through officers who processed his discharge application. Id. at 345-347. The
concepts of "custody" and "custodian" were sufficiently broad to say that the commanding officer in
Indiana, operating through officers in California in processing his claim, was in California for the limited
purpose of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Id.
59 Strait, 406 U.S. at 342.








Padilla and Justice Stevens' dissent also cited Ex parte Endo66 as an
exception which allows a prisoner to properly name someone other than his
immediate physical custodian in a habeas petition.67 In Endo, a habeas
petition filed in California, naming the then custodian of Endo as respondent,
was allowed to stand after the petitioner was removed to Utah.68 The Court
reasoned that while Endo involved a petitioner challenging her present
physical confinement against someone other then her immediate custodian, it
could be distinguished from Padilla's case because in Endo the Northern
District of California acquired jurisdiction before the government removed
Endo.69 In the present case, however, the government transferred Padilla
before his lawyers filed the habeas petition in the Southern District of New
York.70  Endo, therefore, provides a limited exception to the immediate
custodian rule.71 According to Endo, when the habeas petitioner is moved
after properly filing a petition naming her immediate custodian, the original
district court retains jurisdiction over the writ.72 In Padilla's case, the
Southern District never acquired jurisdiction over his petition.73
Finally, the Court addressed Padilla's argument that the unique facts
of the case mandate a new exception to the immediate custodian rule.74 The
majority dismissed this argument because, even though Padilla's detention is
unique in many respects, his habeas petition still challenged the physical
detention by the Executive.75  Thus, the Court determined that Padilla's
petition was not unique in any way that would permit an exception from the
immediate custodian rule, such pertained in Braden, Strait or Endo.76
Accordingly, Commander Marr, not Secretary Rumsfeld, was the only
proper respondent to the habeas petition.77
6 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). (holding that even if the prisoner's immediate physical
custodian was no longer within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and the prisoner's removal after
filing the petition did not cause the District Court to lose jurisdiction over the named respondent, who was
in the District Court's jurisdiction). In Endo, a Japanese-American citizen interned in California by the
War Relocation Authority was allowed to file a habeas petition against the Authority's Assistant Director,
even after being moved to Utah. Id. at 306. In support of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that that
whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have had to detain classes of citizens, pursuant to
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 19, 1942), it had no authority to subject citizens who were
concededly loyal to its leave procedure. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 306.
67 Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2721.
68 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 306.








77 Id. at 2722.
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The second jurisdictional issue was whether the Southern District
has jurisdiction over the respondents. 7' 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)79 limits a district
court's grant of habeas relief to its respective jurisdiction.80  Braden
interpreted this limitation to require that the court reviewing the habeas
petition must have jurisdiction over the custodian named as respondent.8'
Accordingly, after determining that Commander Marr was the proper
respondent to Padilla's petition, the Court turned to analyze whether the
Southern District had jurisdiction over Commander Marr.
82
To begin, the Court examined the construction of § 2241(a) in prior
cases which held that habeas petitions can be filed only in the district of
physical confinement.83 In the majority's opinion, other sections of the
federal habeas statute support this interpretation. 84 If a petitioner seeks
habeas relief from the Court of Appeals, he must explain why he cannot file
the petition in the district court in which he is held.8 5 In addition, the court of
appeals may decline review of the habeas petition and instead transfer it to
the district court with jurisdiction over the prison.86
The majority also noted that Congress had crafted explicit exceptions
to the rule in certain circumstances.8 7 For example, if a petitioner is serving
a sentence in a State that contains more than one district, he may file a
habeas petition in the district that has custody or in the district where he was
convicted and sentenced. 8 Similarly, federal criminal prisoners may file
certain post conviction petitions in the sentencing district courts, as well as in
the districts of confinement. 89  The Court reasoned that such explicit
exceptions would not be necessary if the general habeas provisions allowed a
petitioner to file a habeas challenge outside the district of confinement. 90
After determining that the general rule for habeas challenges limits them to
the district of present physical confinement, the Court analyzed Padilla's
argument for jurisdiction by service of process, based on Braden and Strait.
9 1
78 Id.
79 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1966) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order
of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint
complained of is had").
so Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct at 2722 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1966)).




85 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1948)).
6 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1966)).
87 Id.
88 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1966)).
89 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1996)).
90 Id.
9' Id. at 2723.
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Padilla argued that Braden allowed the assertion of jurisdiction by
service of process, and that the Southern District had jurisdiction over
Secretary Rumsfeld under New York's long-arm statute.92 However, the
Court reasoned that in Braden, the Western District of Kentucky had proper
jurisdiction over an Alabama prisoner because the "respondent was properly
served in that district, 9 3 and that nothing in the service of process dicta
authorizes the use of long-arm statutes to gain jurisdiction over custodians.
94
In the majority's opinion, the fact that the proper respondent to Padilla's
petition is not present in the Southern District is "fatal to habeas
jurisdiction." 95
Padilla also cited Strait to support a state long-arm statute approach
to habeas jurisdiction.96 He argued that just as the court in Strait found the
commanding officer of the petitioner to be "present" in California because of
his position in the hierarchy of command, Secretary Rumsfeld should be
found "present" in the Southern District through his subordinates who took
Padilla into military custody.9 7 The Court rejected this argument because the
circumstances of Strait limited the holding of a custodian "present" in a
district through the actions of his agents to instances where there is a
question of nominal custodian.98  In Padilla's case there is no such
question.99 His petition challenging present physical custody, distinguished
from Braden and Strait, must follow the rule that when a petition for habeas
relief challenges present physical custody, the petitioner must name his
immediate warden as the respondent and file the petition in the district court
of confinement.' °
CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, analyzed the proper
location and respondent for the habeas petition as a question of personal
jurisdiction or venue.10' Like personal jurisdiction or venue rules, violations
of immediate custodian and territorial jurisdiction rules can be waived by the










101 Id., at 2728.
102 Id.
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governed by the venue rules and considerations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 10 3 Instead, the forum location rules for habeas petitions are based
on the habeas statute and case law interpreting it.' °4 Padilla's petition does
not challenge nonphysical custody; it was not filed in the Southern District
before Padilla's transfer; and there was no indication that the Government
refused to tell Padilla's lawyer of his location. 0 5 Under these circumstances,
the justices reasoned, the rules of immediate custodian and territorial
jurisdiction apply, and Padilla's petition was properly dismissed.'
6
DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
raised two issues that, in his opinion, should have persuaded the Court to rule
in Padilla's favor.'07  First, Stevens pointed to possible government
misconduct by failing to give fair notice of the transfer. 08 If the government
had given fair notice to Padilla's counsel of the transfer to the Naval Brig, a
habeas motion could have been filed two days earlier in the Southern
District.' °9 Consequently, similar to Endo, the Southern District should still
retain proper jurisdiction over the petition.'""
Second, Stevens focused on the exceptions to the immediate
custodian and district of confinement rules."' Stevens argued that the
"bright-line" rules drawn by the Court are no longer bright because of the
"numerous exceptions."'"12 In Stevens' opinion, the unique circumstances of
Padilla's case require just such an exception."
13
CONCLUSION
103 Id. at 2728.
104 Id.
105 Id.
'06 Id. at 2728.
107 Id. at 2729.
108 Id. at 2732.
109 Id.
110 Id. The majority had rejected this argument as "counterfactual," because there is no basis to
punish the Government without any hint of misconduct or bad faith in transferring Padilla or giving fair
notice to counsel. Id. at 2726.
I Id. at 2732.
112 Id. at 2733.
113 Id. The majority countered that the dissent does not cite any case to show that the Court has
deviated from the rules as stated. Id. at 2727. To allow courts to make an ad hoc determination for
exceptions based on the circumstances of any case would exceed their "respective jurisdictions"
established by Congress. Id. at 2728. The majority concluded that Padilla's case did not present any
allowable exception to the district of confinement rule as defined by the language of the federal habeas
statute and court precedents; thus, the proper district for his habeas petition is the District of South
Carolina, not the Southern District of New York. Id.
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Padilla's continuing detention in military custody presented an
important constitutional question, whether the Executive has the power to
detain American citizens, arrested on American soil, as enemy combatants.
A fundamental right of citizenship guaranteed under the Constitution is to be
free from physical imprisonment without due process.' 14  The habeas
petition, the "Great Writ" as the Dissent calls it,1l5 has been the traditional
method for the prisoner to challenge an unlawful detention by the
government. However, the reader will greatly disappointed by the Court's
decision to side step the constitutionality of Padilla's military detention and
instead, focus on the procedural adequacy of his habeas petition. In the
majority opinion, the Court repeatedly decried Padilla's argument that the
very special circumstances of his case should qualify his petition for an
exception to the requirements of the habeas statute as irrelevant. In doing so,
the Court ignored the fact that the government supported its exercise of the
extraordinary power to detaining citizens as enemy combatants by arguing
the special circumstances of Padilla's relations to possible terrorist attacks
against the United States. It seems logical that Padilla should be able to
argue for his freedom using the very facts and circumstances the government
relied on to justify his indefinite detention.
The Court focused too narrowly on the form of the Padilla's habeas
petition, rather than considering the sustenance of habeas protection, and in
doing so, the Court missed an important opportunity to protect the most
fundamental rights of an American citizen in times of national crisis.
However, this failure may only represent a delay in answering the
constitutional question-whether American citizens maybe detained by the
Executive without adequate due process. Several other cases before the
Court similarly challenged the powers of the Executive and the military
during times of war. An answer to this question may ultimately determine
the outcome of our nation's efforts to combat global terrorism and the price
we are willing to pay for success.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Wellington Gu
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
115 Id. at 2730.
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